

Message Text

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3335

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 4768

E.O. 11652: GDS 12-31-79

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: ATLANTIC RELATIONS: COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF OCTOBER 5

SUMMARY: IN OCTOBER 5 COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF ATLANTIC RELATIONS AND SPECIFICALLY FRENCH DRAFT NATO DECLARATION, MOST PERMREPS WELCOMED FRENCH LANGUAGE ON SECURITY AND DEFENSE, BUT NOTED OMISSION OF ECONOMIC MATTERS, POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AND OTHER SUBJECTS. MANY ASKED US FOR AN INDICATION OF WHEN TO EXPECT US CONTRIBUTION. CANADIAN REP ASKED ABOUT PARALLELISM BETWEEN US-EC DECLARATION AND NATO DECLARATION.

RUMSFELD SAID ON PERSONAL AND UNINSTRUCTED BASIS THAT US GOAL IN THE ATLANTIC DIALOGUE WAS TO REACH SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF GOVERNMENTS. THIS AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE A SUSTAINABLE BASIS OF SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE IN A CHANGED AND CHANGING WORLD, AND SHOULD GUIDE BUREAUCRACIES IN DEALING WITH CURRENT AND FUTURE ISSUES. ACTUAL DRAFTING OF A DECLARATION TO DECLARE TO THE WORLD WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED WOULD FOLLOW ON NATURALLY. SYG LUNS SAID COUNCIL WOULD MEET ON ATLANTIC DECLARATION AGAIN OCTOBER 10, OR BEFORE IF US WAS READY TO MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION. END SUMMARY.

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1. COUNCIL MET OCTOBER 5 TO DISCUSS ATLANTIC RELATIONS AND SPECIFICALLY TO COMMENT ON FRENCH DRAFT OF ATLANTIC DECLARATION. SYG LUNS REFERRED TO THE NUMBER OF NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD THE TEXT OF A DECLARATION ON ATLANTIC RELATIONS AND SUGGESTED THAT

IF THE COUNCIL ATTEMPTED TO GIVE FULL WEIGHT TO ALL POINTS OF VIEW, THE RESULTING DECLARATION WOULD BE LENGTHY AND DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE.

2. IN THAT CONNECTION, LUNS NOTED THE CENTRAL THEMES OF THE FRENCH TEXT WERE SECURITY AND DEFENSE. OTHER NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS DEALT WITH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS, AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, AND OTHER MATTERS. HE HOPED TODAY'S DISCUSSION WOULD INDICATE HOW MUCH EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PUT ON THESE LATTER SUBJECTS.

3. PECK (UK) SAID HMG WELCOMED THE FRENCH TEXT AND PARTICULARLY ITS EMPHASIS ON DEFENSE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EC, AND THE VITAL ROLE OF US FORCES IN EUROPE TO AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN DEFENSE. PECK SUGGESTED THE COUNCIL SHOULD SET A DEADLINE FOR ANY FURTHER NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS, NOT NECESSARILY DRAFTS.

4. DE STAERCKE (BELGIM) SUPPORTED LUNS' SUGGESTION THAT THE CRUX OF THE NATO DECLARATION SHOULD BE SECURITY IN THE WIDEST SENSE. HE DID NOT THINK, HOWEVER, THAT OTHER SUBJECTS COULD MERELY BE ADDED TO THE FRENCH TEXT. BURDEN-SHRING AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS NEEDED EMPHASIS, EVEN THOUGH FRANCE WOULD PRESUMABLY NOT AGREE TO SUCH LANGUAGE. THE DECLARATION SHOULD HAVE A CERTAIN TONE AND NOT BE MRELY AN INVENTORY OR LIST OF SUBJECTS. IT SHOULD HAVE A SOLEMN AND PERMANENT QUALITY, IN KEEPING WITH RENEWAL OF THE ATLANTIC COMMITMENT. IT SHOULD MENTION DETENTE AND DEFENSE, BECAUSE NATO PUBLICS QUESTIONED THE VALIDITY AND NECESSITY FOR DEFENSE. THE DECLARATION SHOULD BE UNIFORM IN STYLE, TO AVOID "TOO MANY COOKS SPOILING THE BROTH." DE STAERCKE HOPED THE FRENCH TEXT COULD BE A STARTING POINT.

5. DE STAERCKE ASKED AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD WHEN THE US WOULD SUBMIT ITS "TEXT," WHICH HE HOPED TO HAVE RAPIDLY, AND WONDERED IF THE "TEXT" WOULD COME UPON THE COUNCIL AS A SURPRISE. IF THE US DID NOT YET HAVE A TEXT, WHAT DID IT THINK OF THE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION?

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6. RUMSFELD CORRECTED ANY ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION FROM THE LAST COUNCIL MEETING RESULTING FROM BOSS(FRG) COMMENT ABOUT A POSSIBLE US "TEXT." RUMSFELD POINTED OUT HE HAD SPOKEN ONLY OF AN "INPUT" OR "CONTRIBUTION." AS TO THE FRENCH TEXT, THE US CONSIDERED THE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION VALUABLE AND WAS CONSIDERING IT. RUMSFELD REPEATED THAT WASHINGTON WAS CONSIDERING ITS OWN INPUT, BUT THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN IT WOULD BE AVAILABLE.

7. CATALANO (ITALY) SAID ROME BELIEVED THE FRENCH TEXT WAS A GOOD ONE. ITS DRAWBACKS WERE THAT IT DID NOT MENTION MBFR IN PROGRESS TOWARD DETENTE, OMITTED BURDEN-SHRING, AND DID NOT DISCUSS COOPERATION UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE TREATY. THE FRENCH TEXT THEREFORE HAD MERIT AND DEMERITS. CATALANO SUGGESTED LUNS SHOULD TRY TO USE THE FRENCH TEXT AS THE BASIS FOR A DECLARATION, BUT

SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE IMPORTANT SUBJECTS THAT THE FRENCH TEXT OMITTED. IN DRAFTING LANGUAGE ON DETENTE, THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF COULD USE GENERAL FORMULATIONS, SINCE THE FRENCH DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN MBFR. THE NATO DECLARATION SHOULD STRESS AS THE UK DRAFT HAD DONE THAT THERE MUST BE NO UNILATERAL FORCE REDUCTIONS. THE FRENCH TEXT WAS GOOD ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, WHILE THE CANADIAN TEXT GAVE PROPER EMPHASIS TO THE ROLE OF THE ATLANTIC COUNTRIES IN THE WORK.

8. ERALP (TURKEY) WELCOMED THE STRESS IN THE FRENCH TEXT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINUED PRESENCE OF US TROOPS IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, NATO MUST DRAFT THE SECTION ON DETENTE CAREFULLY AND UNDERPLAY THIS CONCEPT FOR THE TIME BEING.

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9. BUSCH (NORWAY) PARTICULARLY LIKED THE PASSAGES IN THE FRENCH TEXT DEALING WITH CONSULTATION. HOWEVER, ATLANTIC COOPERATION COVERED A BROADER RANGE THAN INDICATED IN THE FRENCH TEXT. THE NATO DECLARATION SHOULD COVER HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENT, RESOURCES AND COOPERATION. NORWAY REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR PARALLELISM BETWEEN THE EC-US DOCUMENT AND THE NATO DECLARATION.

10. CHORAFAS (GREECE) BELIEVED HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD LIKE THE FRENCH DRAFT, BUT WOULD NOT WANT A NATO DECLARATION CONFINED TO SECURITY MATTERS ALONE, TO THE EXCLUSION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUBJECTS. AS TO PROCEDURES, CHORAFAS BELIEVED IT WAS NOW TIME FOR THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF TO PREPARE A DRAFT SUMMING UP THE MOST IMPORTANT POINTS SUGGESTED TO DATE.

11. BOSS SAID HIS AUTHORITIES THOUGHT THE FRENCH TEXT SHOULD

BE ONE OF THE BASES FOR DRAFTING A NATO DECLARATION. HE AGREED WITH PECK THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD ESTABLISH A DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION OF CONTRIBUTIONS.

12. NOGUEIRA (PORTUGAL) THOUGHT THE FRENCH TEXT WAS A GOOD ONE, AND SUPPORTED IT AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING ALONG WITH THE
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CANADIAN PAPER.

13. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) SAID THE HAGUE PARTICULARLY WELCOMED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE FRENCH TEXT MIGHT BECOME A SECTION IN THE NATO DECLARATION DEALING WITH SECURITY AND DEFENSE, SUBSCRIBED TO BY THE FIFTEEN. BUT THE NATO DECLARATION SHOULD COVER A WIDER AREA THAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY. THE FACT THAT THE FRENCH TEXT DEALT WITH CSCE ARGUED FOR THE NECESSITY TO MENTION OTHER EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS. TONE AND STYLE WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN THE NATO DECLARATION.

14. MENZIES (CANADA) WELCOMED THE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION AND WILLINGNESS TO JOIN IN DRAFTING. HOWEVER, CANADA BELIEVED THAT THE FULL DECLARATION SHOULD BE COUCHED IN BROADER TERMS. AS TO PROCEDURES, DRAFTING WAS OF DIRECT INTEREST TO ALL THE ALLIES. NATO SHOULD PROCEED IN THE NORMAL WAY, GOING PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH THROUGH A DRAFT DECLARATION. MENZIES THOUGHT THAT MOST COUNCIL MEMBERS HAD AGREED EARLIER TO USE THE CANADIAN DRAFT AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING, AND CANADA BELIEVED THE ALLIES SHOULD PROCEED ON AN INTER-DELEGATION BASIS FOR A WHILE BEFORE THE SECRETARY GENERAL PRODUCED A SYNTHESIS.

15. LUNS VERY HELPFULLY AND CORRECTLY OBSERVED THAT THERE WAS NO "NORMAL WAY" TO DRAFT SOMETHING AS UNIQUE AS AN ATLANTIC DECLARATION.

16. RUMSFELD SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT FORM THE US INPUT WOULD TAKE, WHETHER A TEXT, GENERAL COMMENTS, OR SPECIFIC COMMENTS. TO HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, NONE OF THESE POSSIBILITIES HAD BEEN RULED OUT. AS TO TIMING, NOW THAT ALMOST ALL ALLIES HAD SPOKEN, THE US WAS STUDYING THESE CONTRIBUTIONS AND WOULD BE RESPONDING IN SOME FORM.

17. RUMSFELD CONTINUED ON A PERSONAL AND UNINSTRUCTED BASIS THAT WHAT DE STAERCKE HAD SAID ABOUT THE VALUE OF TONE, COHESION AND UNITY IN A NATO DECLARATION WAS SOUND. IN RUMSFELD'S PERSONAL OPINION IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COME UP WITH A DOCUMENT THAT REFLECTED A MULTIPLICITY OF SUGGESTIONS AND STILL HAD THE DESIRED TONE AND COHESION. NEXT, RUMSFELD SAID HE FELT IT WAS USEFUL TO RECALL THAT WHAT IS REALLY IMPORTANT IS THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT IS AGREED UPON AMONG THE FIFTEEN NATIONS. A
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DECISION ABOUT
HOW TO DECLARE TO THE WORLD WHAT IT WAS THE ALLIES HAD AGREED UPON
WAS A LESS DIFFICULT TASK.

18. RUMSFELD REMINDED THE COUNCIL OF THE US GOAL WITH RESPECT
TO THE VERY USEFUL DIALOGUE OR PROCESS THAT HAS BEEN AND IS TAKING
PLACE ON ATLANTIC RELATIONS. THE US SOUGHT A DIALOGUE ON THE ATLANTIC
RELATIONSHIP AND PARTNERSHIP THAT WOULD RESULT IN PUTTING IT ON
A SUSTAINABLE BASIS FOR THE YEARS AHEAD, THAT WOULD HELP REDUCE THE
BUFFETING AND UNCERTAINTIES. TO BE SUSTAINABLE THE
US HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE RELATIONSHIP MUST BE ROOTED IN THE
REALITIES
OF THE WORLD TODAY, WITH A CREATIVE LOOK AT OUR ANTICIPATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE. THE RELATIONSHIP AND OUR AGREEMENT CONCERNING IT
MUST THEREFORE REFLECT THE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN
PLACE IN THE WORLD, POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND OTHER.
FURTHER, TO BE SUSTAINABLE THE RELATIONSHIP AND THE AGREEMENT WHICH
A DECLARATION WOULD DESCRIBE MUST BE SUCH TO EARN A BROAD BASE OF
SUPPORT AMONG OUR PUBLICS AND PARLIAMENTS.

19. CONTINUING ON A PERSONAL BASIS, RUMSFELD SAID THAT WHAT THE 15
NATIONS AGREE TO CONCERNING THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP AND WHAT THE
ALLIES THEN PUBLICLY DECLARE
TO DESCRIBE THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD HELP TO LIFT THE EYES OF THE
TECHNICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS AND TO PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK, A DIRECTION
AND GUIDE FOR THEM AS THEY PROCEEDED TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUES OF
TODAY AND TOMORROW. IN PUTTING FORWARD OUR "SHRED VIEW OF THE WORLD"
WE MUST PLANT SOME FLAGS OR GOLAS DOWN THE ROAD THAT HELP TO CHART
THE DIRECTION AND IN ADDITION PROVIDE SOME GUIDELINES AS TO HOW
WE AS PARTNERS INTEND TO TRAVEL THAT ROAD.

20. FINALLY, AND AGAIN ON A PERSONAL BASIS, RUMSFELD UNDERLINED
THAT ONE OF THE MATTERS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE US, AS EMPHASIZED
IN DR. KISSINGER'S SPEECH WAS IN SEEING THAT THE ALLIANCE,
THE PARTNERSHIP, WAS BASED ON AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
BURDEN. THIS DISTRIBUTION SHOULD BE AND MUST BE SEEN BY OUR
PUBLICS TO BE BASED UPON THE ECONOMIC REALITIES OF THE 1970'S.

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21. DE STAERCKE AGREED WITH RUMSFELD'S COMMENTS. HE HELPFULLY UNDERLINED LUNS POINT THAT U.S. IDEAS WERE BASIC TO THE SUCCESS OF A DECLARATION, HE ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR LUNS TO DRAW UP A SYNTHESIS UNTIL U.S. VIEWS WERE KNOWN. AS TO BURDEN-SHARING, COULD THE U.S. SUPPLY ITS PREFERRED LANGUAGE?

22. RUMSFELD SAID CONCERNING BURDEN-SHARING THAT HE HAD TRIED NOT TO PREJUDGE WHAT OR WHETHER SOMETHING WOULD BE SAID ABOUT THIS IN THE NATO DECLARATION. HE HAD DRAWN A DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS AGREED UPON BY THE 15 NATIONS AND HOW IT IS PUBLICLY DECLARED, THE FORMER BEING OF FIRST IMPORTANCE. HE RECALLED THAT THE KISSINGER SPEECH HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT WANTED BURDEN-SHARING PLACED ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS AND THAT IT MUST BE SEEN BY OUR PUBLICS TO BE ON AND EQUITABLE BASIS.

23. NOTING THAT CANADA HAD STRESSED THE NEED FOR PARALLELISM BETWEEN THE EC-U.S. AND NATO DRAFTS, MENZIES ASKED RUMSFELD WHAT PROCEDURES NATO SHOULD FOLLOW. HE HAD HEARD THAT EC NINE POLITICAL DIRECTORS WERE MEETING WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESSEL BEFORE AND AFTER DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT TO THE UK ON OCTOBER 15. WOULD THE U.S. BE IN A POSITION TO CONTRIBUTE TO CONFIDENTIAL

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THE NATO DEBATE ONLY AFTER THE U.S.-EC DISCUSSIONS WERE FURTHER ALONG? IF SO, IT WOULD AFFECT THE PARALLELISM IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. RUMSFELD SAID HE DID NOT KNOW.

24. LUNS REFERRED TO STATEMENTS BY HIGHLY-PLACED U.S. REPRESENTATIVES THAT THEY WANTED TO HAVE A NATO DECLARATION WELL UNDERWAY BEFORE AGREEING TO AN EC-U.S. DECLARATION. RUMSFELD SAID VARIOUS COMMENTS AND IMPRESSIONS WERE CIRCULATING BUT HE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY FIRM U.S. VIEW OTHER THAN A DESIRE TO SEE PROGRESS.

25. MENZIES ASKED IF IT WAS CORRECT THAT STOESSEL AND THE SECRETARY WERE DISCUSSING THE NATO DECLARATION ONLY BILATERALLY, NOT MULTILATERALLY (WITH EC-9). RUMSFELD SAID HE HAD NO FIRM INFORMATION ON THAT.

26. DE STAERCKE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE U.S. ANSWER TO THE CANADIAN QUESTION. HE SAID HE FELT THE COUNCIL SHOULD MAKE MORE PROGRESS BEFORE DR. KISSINGER WENT TO LONDON ON

OCTOBER 15. HE SAID WITH A SMILE THAT THE COUNCIL WAS WAITING "IMPATIENTLY" FOR A U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO PRESERVE PARALLELISM. LUNS AGREED, AND SAID NATO SHOULD NOT BE SEEN OR SAID TO BE DOING NOTHING.

27. RUMSFELD, AGAIN SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND ON AN UNINSTRUCTED BASIS, SAID AS REGARDS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO DECLARATIONS THAT LOGIC WOULD CALL FOR THEM TO PROCEED AT A PACE NOT OUT OF PHASE WITH ONE ANOTHER, AND THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD ANYONE SUGGEST THAT NATO WAS DOING NOTHING. AS TO "IMPATIENCE," ALLIED SUGGESTIONS REGARDING NATO'S RESPONSE TO THE U.S. INITIATIVE OF APRIL 23 HAD ONLY BEGUN ARRIVING RECENTLY. THIS INDICATED THAT THESE WERE IMPORTANT SUBJECTS REQUIRING TIME FOR CONSIDERED RESPONSES.

28. LUNS REFERRED TO MENZIES' QUESTION ABOUT MEETINGS BETWEEN STOESSEL AND THE EC POLITICAL DIRECTORS, AND WONDERED "IN A WILD MOMENT" WHETHER STOESSEL AND THE DIRECTORS GENERAL MIGHT COME TO THE COUNCIL. DE STAERCKE DISCOURAGED LUNS FROM PURSUING THIS IDEA.

29. ON BURDEN-SHARING, CHORAFAS THOUGHT THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE NO CONFIDENTIAL

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SPECIFIC PROPOSAL AS YET, BUT THAT A NATO DECLARATION COULD MAKE SOME REFERENCE TO THIS, WITH DETAILED WORK ON THE PROBLEM FOLLOWING IN THE WAKE OF THE DECLARATION.

30. LUNS SAID NATO COULD NOT HOPE TO SOLVE THE BURDEN-SHARING PROBLEM IN A STATEMENT, BUT THE WAY THIS PARAGRAPH WAS DRAFTED WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR PUBLIC OPINION. LUNS PROPOSED TO AWAIT A U.S. CONTRIBUTION OR INPUT, BUT SAID THE NATO FINAL TEXT SHOULD BE THE PRODUCT OF THE ALLIANCE.

31. RUMSFELD UNDERLINED THAT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE ATLANTIC PARTNERS WERE ABLE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS AND THEN DECLARE THEM THE DECISIONS WOULD REQUIRE DECISIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN OUR GOVERNMENTS. THE PROCESS OF ARRIVING AT AN ATLANTIC DECLARATION WAS DIFFERENT FROM A COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING SESSION, AND WE OUGHT NOT TO ASSUME THAT OUR HABITS AND PROCEDURES FROM SUCH SESSIONS ARE NECESSARILY APPROPRIATE. LUNS AGREED.

32. DE ROSE (FRANCE) SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE SPEEDY COMMENTS ON THE FRENCH DRAFT AND THE WELCOME GIVEN ITS DISCUSSION OF DEFENCE AND DETENTE. HE HAD NOTED THAT PERMREPS HAD SAID THEY FOUND NO LANGUAGE ON MBFR AND BURDEN-SHARING, AMONG OTHER THINGS. HE WOULD AWIT THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION, WHICH WAS ESSENTIAL FOR A USEFUL DISCUSSION. THE COUNCIL SHOULD HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF ALL SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO THE ALLIES.

33. LUNS SUMMED UP THAT THE FRENCH DRAFT WAS VERY IMPORTANT;

SOME BELIEVED IT SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR A NATO DECLARATION,
WHILE OTHERS HAD DIFFERENT IDEAS; THE COUNCIL WOULD AWAIT A
U.S. INPUT AND DISCUSS THIS CONTRIBUTION; THE COUNCIL MIGHT
HOLD A FURTHER DISCUSSION BEFORE NEXT WEDNESDAY TO PRECEDE
SEC. KISSINGER'S TRIP TO LONDON, AS THE DEAN PROPOSED,
ASSUMING THE U.S. INPUT WAS AVAILABLE AS IS HOPED.

34. GUIDANCE REQUESTED. RUMSFELD

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